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MEDICAL ERRORS:  CAUSES, CURES, AND CAPITALISM 
KEITH MYERS, M.D., J.D.1 
He that will not apply new remedies must expect new evils. 
-Benjamin Franklin 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Expenditures for healthcare consumed over thirteen percent of the United States 
gross domestic product in 1998, totaling over $1.1 trillion dollars.2  A recent Institute 
of Medicine (IOM) report estimated that the number of deaths attributable to medical 
                                                                
1Dr. Myers is a board certified internist who practices emergency medicine full time.  He 
was a member of the University of Florida Law Review and a 2001 graduate.  He is a member 
of the Florida Bar and operates LexMed, a medicolegal consulting service.  Dr. Myers would 
like to dedicate this article to his family:  Drue, Devon, and Dane.  E-mail contact:  
keithm@gator.net. 
2See, Healthcare Costs Grow in Relation to U.S. Economy, HCFA Report Shows, MED. 
INDUSTRY TODAY, Jan. 12, 2000, § Providers (citing Health Care Financing Administration 
(HCFA) data, (which reported a 5.6 percent rise in healthcare costs for 1998, matching overall 
U.S. economic growth). 
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errors in the U.S. was as high as 98,000.3  This number represented hospital deaths 
only.4  Undoubtedly, additional deaths and injuries occurred in the outpatient 
setting.5  Whether the IOM estimate was exaggerated or not, the larger issue is 
whether the overall healthcare industry is operating at an acceptable error rate.6  If 
the error rate is unacceptably high, then what should it be?7  Are there legal 
impediments to detecting, reporting, analyzing, and improving error rates?8  
This article explores the causes of medical error, the medical profession’s 
responses to errors, and how the legal system responds to medical error through 
litigation and legislation.  Part II discusses the definition of “medical error,” the 
frequency and pervasiveness of the problem, and the causes at the individual and 
system level.  Part III considers how the culture of medicine has largely failed to 
address medical errors as a systems-based problem, and how the legal culture 
discourages admitting errors due to the threat of litigation.  Focusing on systems, 
data must be collected and analyzed, and legal guidelines developed to encourage 
error reporting and develop standards, preferably at the state level.  Part IV examines 
how both the legal and medical cultures might be reformed in order to reduce the rate 
of medical error, which would promote the ultimate goal of better quality healthcare.  
Legal barriers against error reporting need to be removed and liability theories re-
evaluated, with appropriate legislation to foster these changes.  Part V discusses the 
role of economic incentives which promoted the current state of affairs, and how 
these forces might effectively be employed to shape medical, legal, and legislative 
responses to medical error.  It is clear that if medical error rates are unacceptably 
high, new approaches by doctors, lawyers, patients, and legislators are needed.   
II.  ERROR CLASSIFICATION 
A.  What is Medical Error? 
A Jehovah’s witness is given a blood products infusion to reduce her risk of 
bleeding.9  A seven-year-old-boy dies after receiving the wrong medication from an 
                                                                
3INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR IS HUMAN:  BUILDING A BETTER HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 
31 (Linda T. Kohn et al., eds., 2000) [hereinafter IOM REPORT]. 
4See id. 
5See e.g., Eric J. Thomas et al., Costs of Medical Injuries in Utah and Colorado, 36 
INQUIRY 255 (1999) (describing costs of adverse events, including outpatients). 
6See Clement J. McDonald et al., Deaths Due to Medical Errors are Exaggerated in 
Institute of Medicine Report, 284 JAMA 93 (2000); Lucian L. Leape, Institute of Medicine 
Medical Errors Figures are Not Exaggerated, 284 JAMA 95 (2000). 
7See e.g., Thomas Bodenheimer, The American Health Care System — The Movement for 
Improved Quality in Health Care, 340 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 488, 490-92 (1999)(suggesting “six 
sigma” quality goal, an error tolerance level of less than 3.4 errors per million events). 
8See Bryan A. Liang, Promoting Patient Safety Through Reducing Medical Error: A 
Paradigm of Cooperation Between Patient, Physician, and Attorney, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 541, 
549-57 (2000) [hereinafter Liang, Promoting Patient Safety]. 
9See Gregory S. Loeben, To Disclose or Not to Disclose? A Case of Medical Mistake, 2 
MED. CROSSFIRE 80 (2000). 
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unlabelled cup on an operating room tray.10  In the first case, the patient is unharmed 
and unaware that her caregivers have violated her religion-based treatment refusal.11  
In the second case, a child is dead, and a family is devastated.12  Are these medical 
errors?  It seems intuitively clear that the second case is, but what about the first? 
The term “error” suggests an unintentional act or omission.13  By logical 
extension, the term “medical error” suggests an unintentional act that is related to the 
practice of medicine.14  Patient death or injury is thus not required to meet this 
definition.  Rather, it is sufficient that patient safety is inadvertently threatened, 
whether actual or potential, or that a patient’s refusal for service is not obeyed.15  
Note that patient errors might also be included in this definition if, for example, a 
patient commits a mistake with medication that proper education could have 
prevented.16 
Excluded from this definition of medical error are willful, reckless, and 
intentional acts or omissions, because these are outside the scope of “inadvertent.”17  
Even though a reckless act or omission may be unintentional, it falls so far outside of 
the realm of a reasonable standard of due care that it is not mere negligence.18  
Rather, recklessness implies an indifference equivalent to willful behavior.19  
Examples of such recklessness might include a surgeon who operates while 
intoxicated, or a doctor who treats a condition for which he is not trained despite the 
availability of referral for more appropriate care.20  Res ipsa loquitor, however, is a 
policy-based legal doctrine which creates an inference of negligence (in many 
jurisdictions), and is reasonably viewed as within the definition of medical error.21 
                                                                
10See Rebecca Voelker, “Treat Systems Not Errors,” Experts Say, 276 JAMA 1537, 1538 
(1996). 
11See Loeben, supra note 9, at 80. 
12See Voelker, supra note 10, at 1537-38. 
13Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 771 (1971) defines error as:  
1a: an act or condition of often ignorant or imprudent deviation from a code or 
behavior… b: …an unintentional deviation from truth or accuracy… c: an act that  
through ignorance, deficiency, or accident departs from or fails to achieve what should 
be done… 3: something produced by mistake… 6: a deficiency or imperfection in 
structure or function: DEFECT. 
14See Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, supra note 8, at 542. 
15See id. 
16See id 
17See id 
18See id.  Conduct on this level also includes intentional torts such as battery, and criminal 
acts.  Liang, supra note 8. 
19BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1270 (6th ed. 1990). 
20See e.g., Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996) (finding physician 
negligent for performing operation he was not trained to do). 
21See e.g., Ybarra v. Spagnard, 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944) (allowing an inference of 
negligence). 
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B.  The Scope of the Problem 
A recent report by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) estimated that between 44,000 
and 98,000 patients die each year in the U.S. from medical errors.22  The IOM 
arrived at this number by extrapolation from previous studies in New York, Utah and 
Colorado.23  Other prior studies also showed a substantial risk of death from medical 
error.24 
The IOM report has been criticized for its methodological flaws, and for possibly 
overestimating the actual number of deaths caused by medical error.25  Alternatively, 
the IOM report has been criticized for study design flaws that may have resulted in 
an underestimate of deaths.26  Of note is that the IOM report’s number of deaths 
estimate was derived solely from data on hospitalized patients.27  Certainly, 
outpatients also die from medical error, though the number of deaths is uncertain.28 
Adverse events and outcomes occur in the absence of medical error, and it may 
be important to make methodological or semantic distinctions between adverse 
events and medical errors.29  Regardless of these technical concerns and of the 
criticism of the IOM report, medical errors do occur at some rate.  The major 
premise of this discussion is that this rate is too high.30  Further, there is a subgroup 
of errors causing patient harm which is preventable.31  For example, in the Utah and 
Colorado study the cost of preventable adverse events was nearly half of the total 
                                                                
22See IOM Report, supra note 3, at 31. 
23See id. at 30-31 (citing Troyen A Brennan et. al., Incidence of Adverse Events and 
Negligence in Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study, 324 
ENG. J. MED. 370 (1991), and Eric J. Thomas et al., Cost of Medical Injuries in Utah and 
Colorado, 36 INQUIRY 255 (1999)). 
24See e.g., David C. Classen et al., Adverse Drug Events in Hospitalized Patients, 277 
JAMA 301 (1997)(finding that adverse drug events caused an almost two-fold increased risk 
of death); David P. Phillips et al., Increase in U.S. Medication-Error Deaths Between 1983 
and 1993, 351 LANCET 643 (1998) (finding 2.57-fold increase in medication deaths). 
25See e.g., Troyan A. Brennan, The Institute of Medicine Report on Medical Errors—
Could it Do Harm?, 342 N. ENG. J. MED. 1123 (2000)(arguing that hospital care is actually 
becoming safer, distinguishing terms adverse event and error, and criticizing IOM 
methodology); Clement J. McDonald et al., Deaths Due to Medical Errors are Exaggerated in 
Institute of Medicine Report, 284 JAMA 93 (2000) (criticizing IOM methodology). 
26See Lucian L. Leape, Institute of Medicine Figures are Not Exaggerated, 284 JAMA 95 
(2000) (arguing that IOM report may have underestimated number of deaths). 
27See IOM Report, supra note 3, at 29-31. 
28See supra note 23.  Comprehensive estimates for overall outpatient deaths due to 
medical error are not available.  Medication error seems to be the most studied outpatient 
medical error.   
29See Brennan, supra  note 25, at 1123-25. 
30See Bodenheimer, supra note 7, at 488 (1999) (discussing healthcare quality, comparison 
with other industries, and organizations for monitoring quality). 
31See id. at 488-89. 
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costs attributable to adverse events.32  The physician’s credo primum non nocerum 
(“first do no harm”), thus suggests that it is incumbent upon medical doctors to lead 
the effort to reduce medical errors.33 
C.  Errors Occur at the Level of the Individual 
If medical error creates potential harm to a patient, when does it occur during the 
delivery of healthcare?  The answer is that it can occur at any stage of medical care.34  
Despite the complexity of healthcare as a “system,” actual delivery of care operates 
at the individual level.35  Thus, the common denominator for all healthcare is a one-
on-one interaction between a provider and a patient.36  It is this interpersonal 
dynamic which exposes or creates error potential at various stages, such as 
examination, testing, diagnostic theorizing, or treatment, to name a few.37  Since 
healthcare is delivered at the human level, medical errors are ultimately attributable 
to a person and not to an institution or system.38  This fact does not mean that legal 
liability for errors rests solely at the individual level, for clearly organizations and 
hospitals may be found liable for medical errors.39 
If the endpoint or baseline source for all medical error is at the provider-patient 
level, then what can be done about it?  Both sides of the care delivery equation, 
patients and providers, want to reduce medical error rates to the lowest feasible 
level.40  A reduction in medical error rates would be cost-effective through more 
efficient resource allocation, and the quality of care would improve.41  However, 
there are undoubtedly members of the plaintiff bar who fear economic harm if 
medical error rates are substantially reduced.42  This latter group has an incentive to 
maintain the status quo, or to allow error rates to increase, in order to flourish.43  
Therefore, it is not so straightforward to claim that reducing errors is a universal 
goal.  
                                                                
32See id. 
33See Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, supra note 8, at 563. 
34See IOM Report, supra note 3, at 35-36. 
35See CHARLES VINCENT & BAS DE MOL, SAFETY IN MEDICINE 233 (2000). 
36See id. 
37See IOM Report, supra note 3, at 35-36.  Author’s note: A “computer error” might be 
blamed for a medical mistake by an automatic dose delivery machine.  Even here, though, 
error would likely be traceable to the human who designed, built, or programmed the machine, 
or entered incorrect patient data. 
38See Liang, supra note 8, at 542. 
39See e.g., Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Illinois, 730 N.E. 2d 278 (Ill. 2000) (holding 
HMO potentially liable for doctor’s negligence because HMO assigned excessive number of 
patients to the doctor). 
40See Bodenheimer, supra note 7, at 490-92. 
41See id. 
42See Jeffrey Ghannam, Goal to Reduce Medical Errors is Fraught With Difficulties, 86 
A.B.A. J. 88 (2000). 
43See id. 
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D.  System Errors 
Although errors are committed by individuals and affect only one patient at a 
time, the provider-patient interaction does not occur in a vacuum.44  This interaction 
is influenced by the environment, an external force which increases or decreases the 
chance for inevitable human error.45  This outside force, in the context of a medical 
errors discussion, is labeled a system.46  A system may be defined as, “a complex 
unity formed of many often diverse parts subject to a common plan or serving a 
common purpose.”47  Alternatively, a system is defined as “an organized or 
established procedure or method or the set of materials or appliances used to carry it 
out.”48  
A healthcare system may thus be viewed as an environmental force which is 
complex, establishes procedures and methods, and serves a common purpose.  
Because this force exerts an influence on the patient-provider encounter, it is 
necessary to examine whether the healthcare system promotes or can prevent 
medical errors.49  One caveat is required: Systems exist in many forms and sizes.50  
In the medical context, for example, a system may be a single doctor’s office, an 
operating room, or a large network of hospitals.51 
Regardless of the size or complexity of a system, research has consistently shown 
human error can be accounted for, measured, and reduced through proper 
organization and methodology.52  Medical systems are often compared with other 
industries, particularly aviation and nuclear energy.53  Research shows systems in 
these other industries, through proper design and monitoring, share the potential to 
reduce the likelihood of mishap caused by human error.54  For example, aircraft 
                                                                
44See IOM Report, supra note 3, at 49-52. 
45See id.  See also Robert E. Anderson et al., The Sensitivity and Specificity of Clinical 
Diagnostics During Five Decades: Toward an Understanding of Necessary Fallibility, 261 
JAMA 1610, 1614 (1989). 
46See IOM Report, supra note 3, at 52. 
47See WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 2322. 
48See id. 
49See VINCENT & DE MOL, supra note 35, at 66-67.  See also Liang, Promoting Patient 
Safety, supra note 8, at 544-45; and, Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851, 
1853 (1994). 
50See IOM Report, supra note 3, at 52. 
51See id.  For example, the Veterans Administration’s entire network of hospitals can be 
viewed as a single system.  Within this larger system are smaller systems at the hospital and 
sub-hospital levels. 
52See Leape, supra note 49, at 1854.  See also Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, supra note 
8, at 544-45; Lucian L. Leape, Promoting Patient Safety by Preventing Medical Error, 280 
JAMA 1444, 1445 (1998) [hereinafter Preventing Medical Error]. 
53See Leape, supra note 49, at 1854.  See also Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, supra note 
8, at 544-45. 
54See Leape, Preventing Medical Error, supra note 52, at 1444-45. 
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manufacturers assume human error will occur, so the planes are designed with 
automatic and redundant features that effectively buffer or absorb pilot error.55 
Individual and system errors may be distinguished by labeling them as “active” 
and “latent,” respectively.56  Active errors occur at the individual operator level, and 
usually have more immediate effects.57  Latent errors are system-based potential 
errors: Potential meaning that they trigger or promote error.58  Latent errors are 
removed from individual control, and because they are unrecognized in a complex 
system, pose a greater threat to safety.59  A latent error in a complex system can 
promote multiple active errors before someone recognizes the system’s flaw.60  
Unfortunately, for the patient who is injured or killed prior to that moment of flaw 
recognition, any system fixes come too late. 
III.  MEDICAL AND LEGAL INFLUENCES 
A.  Pathology of the Medical Culture 
Physicians are taught to be compulsive and to attend to detail, which is an 
inarguably desirable feature of their training.61  They are also taught that mistakes are 
caused by individual failure.62  My personal experience as a medical student and 
internal medicine resident was entirely consistent with these observations.63  The 
medical culture persists in propagating the myth that the appropriate standard of 
medical care is error free.64  Any failure to uphold this standard is viewed as an 
individual failure, and the doctor alone is viewed as culpable.65 
Rather than admit that perfection is an unrealistic standard, medical training and 
practice persist in demanding error free practice.66  This fosters what one 
commentator labels the “shame and blame” mentality of the medical culture toward 
medical error.67  Physicians are taught to feel shame for any mistake, and to accept 
                                                                
55See Leape, supra note 49, at 1855. 
56See IOM Report, supra note 3, at 55-56. 
57See id. 
58See David W. Bates & Atul A. Gawande, Error in Medicine: What Have We Learned?, 
132 ANN. INT. MED. 763 (2000). 
59See IOM Report, supra note 3, at 55-56. 
60See id. 
61See Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, supra note 8, at 545. 
62See Bates & Gawande, supra note 58, at 763. 
63M.D., University of Miami, 1987; residency, University of Hawaii, 1987-1990; Board 
Certified, Internal Medicine, 1990. 
64See Leape, supra note 49, at 1852. 
65See Bates & Gawande, supra note 58, at 763. 
66See Leape, supra note 49, at 1852. 
67See Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, supra note 8, at 545. 
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the entire blame.68  In some instances this approach may be entirely appropriate.  
Some who attend medical school or enter residency training are simply not up to the 
job.  Others, upon clearing the hurdles of training, commit overt malpractice and 
deserve to be blamed and punished.  However, unyielding reliance on the reactive 
shame and blame approach, rather than attempting some degree of a proactive 
systems based approach, has been criticized for failing to adequately self-regulate the 
medical profession69  or reduce error rates.70  Further, the reactive approach probably 
has little or no effect on latent errors, because these are not consistently admitted or 
reported.71 
In clinical terms, the medical culture’s traditional focus on individual culpability 
for error is pathological in the sense that such a mentality flatly ignores a reality that 
doctors are themselves clearly aware of: Humans make mistakes, and this includes 
doctors!  If a patient so adamantly denied this reality despite objective evidence to 
the contrary, his doctor would diagnose him as having insane delusions.  Also, the 
provider’s fear of blame and guilt for errors provides a disincentive to be forthright.72  
The fear of being sued is a major deterrent to admitting or reporting errors.73  Loss of 
hospital privileges or insurance contracts, or sanctioning by medical boards provide 
additional disincentives to admit error.74  Thus, while no physician can objectively 
deny that errors happen to them or their colleagues, the culture of medicine exists in 
a state of suspended disbelief.75 
Although personal accountability is a desirable norm for any professional, the 
medical culture has traditionally overemphasized individual culpability at the 
expense of failure to truly explore the alternative explanations or mechanisms which 
promote error.76  Not until fairly recently has the medical culture realized that 
systems play a substantial, if not preeminent, role in promoting medical errors.77  
This is a step in the right direction.  The sad irony of the traditional approach is that 
it ignores fundamental medical diagnostics and treatment philosophy.  Diseases are 
the underlying cause of symptoms, so find and fix the former to cure the latter.  How 
many more patients must die due to faulty systems before the primum non nocerum 
clause is triggered? 
                                                                
68See id. 
69See Joan Vogel & Richard Delgado, To Tell the Truth: Physicians’ Duty to Disclose 
Medical Mistakes, 28 UCLA L. REV. 52, 58-59 (1980). 
70See Voelker, supra note 10, at 1537-38. 
71See id. 
72See Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example From 
Medical Practice, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1447, 1467 (2000); see id.; Leape, supra note 49, at 
1852; Voelker, supra note 10, at 1537. 
73See Jeffrey Ghannam, Goal to Reduce Medical Errors is Fraught With Difficulty, 86 
A.B.A. J. 88 (2000); David Orentlicher, Medical Malpractice: Treating the Causes Instead of 
the Symptoms, 28 MED CARE 247, 247-49 (2000). 
74See Leape et al., Preventing Medical Error, supra note 52, at 1444. 
75See id. 
76See VINCENT & DE MOL, supra note 35, at 70. 
77See Voelker, supra note 10, at 1537-38 and, Leape, supra note 49, at 1852. 
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B.  Legal Disincentives Error Reporting 
Similar to the way the environmental forces of systems influence the endpoint 
provider-patient error rate, the medical profession’s perceived “wall of silence”78  
does not arise in isolation from factors external to medicine.79  Aside from shame or 
guilt, physicians are reluctant to admit errors because of the perceived threat of 
litigation or other sanctions.80  Whether this threat is real or imaginary, the legal 
culture is a contributing cause of physicians’ reluctance to admit errors.81  Traditional 
malpractice claims for negligence, and the discoverability of voluntarily reported 
error data are the two primary sources of this reluctance.82  This section explores 
these roadblocks to error reporting or error-rate reduction attempts. 
The concept of medical malpractice was described in Sir William Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England in 1768.83  In the United States, medical 
malpractice claims were uncommon until the mid-1800s.84  The rise in claims in that 
era paralleled the development of more standardized medical practice and education, 
and the use of innovative techniques by physicians.85  In response to the threat of 
suits, many physicians could purchase malpractice insurance by the end of the 
nineteenth century.86  Ironically, as innovation and standardization improved medical 
knowledge and quality, there arose identifiable “standards” of care which plaintiffs 
could allege were breached as the basis for a negligence claim.87  Also, the presence 
of liability insurance made physicians more desirable targets for plaintiff’s lawyers, a 
feature which persists in the current malpractice system.88 
                                                                
78See Vogel & Delgado, supra note 69, at 52-54. 
79See Lawrence Gostin, A Public Health Approach to Reducing Error: Medical 
Malpractice as a Barrier, 283 JAMA 1742 (2000). 
80See id. at 1742-43; Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, supra note 8, at 555-59.  Other 
sanctions affect government contracts, hospital privileges, or medical licensure.  See Gostin, 
supra note 79, at 1742-43. 
81See Jeffrey Ghannam, supra note 73, at 88. 
82See id. 
83See James C. Mohr, American Medical Malpractice Litigation in Historical Perspective, 
283 JAMA 1731, 1732 (2000) (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS 
OF ENGLAND 122 (1768), where Blackstone used the term mala praxis to describe neglect or 
unskilled practice as breaking a patient’s trust and causing injury).  See also Roger N. Braden 
& Jennifer L. Lawrence, Medical Malpractice: Understanding the Evolution-Breaking the 
Revolution, 25 N. KY. L. REV. 675, 693 (1998) (citing Cross v. Guthery, 2 Root 90 (Conn. 
1794) as the earliest U.S. case of medical malpractice). 
84See Mohr, supra note 83, at 1731-43.  According to Mohr, the social factors which 
promoted the rise of malpractice litigation included Americans’ less religiously fatalistic 
attitude about personal health, and the lack of government or self-regulation of medical 
practice.  See id. 
85See id. at 1735-37. 
86See id. at 1736-37. 
87See id. 
88See Mohr, supra note 83, at 1731-43. 
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Two major goals of medical malpractice litigation are to compensate negligently 
injured patients, and to deter negligent behavior.89  Unfortunately, the present legal 
system is a very inefficient and inaccurate means of promoting these goals.90  Only a 
small percentage of injured patients actually attempt to sue their doctors.91  Many 
victims of medical negligence simply fail to realize that they were wrongfully 
injured, and fail to seek legal redress.92  Conversely, other patients who have adverse 
or suboptimal outcomes not caused by negligence file suit against their providers.93   
The legal system’s failure to consistently promote and enforce the injury-
compensation and deterrence policies of medical negligence actions has thus failed 
to provide clear guidance to the medical community.94  One message is that if a 
doctor is negligent, he probably won’t be sued.95  The concurrent message is that 
providing non-negligent care is not clearly a shield from patients at least attempting 
to sue.96  Therefore, negligent practitioners are neither effectively punished nor 
deterred, and the more careful physicians are randomly punished in spite of their 
diligence.97 
As a result of the apparent randomness of negligence liability, doctors are faced 
with a disincentive to report medical errors.98  Additionally, the threat of litigation 
promotes defensive medical practices.99  Extra tests, procedures, and therapies are 
recommended by doctors in an attempt to avoid gaps where plaintiffs’ lawyers may 
                                                                
89See Troyen A. Brennan, Medical Malpractice Reform-The Long View, 11 J. CLIN. ANES. 
265 (1999).  A third social function of the tort system is to provide corrective justice, but this 
is “impossible to measure.”  See id. 
90See id. at 265. 
91See Orentlicher, supra note 73, at 248.  Indigent patients are the least likely to sue, 
though they are the patients most in need of compensation for injury.  See id. 
92See Vogel & Delgado, supra note 69, at 56-57.  With the prevalence of personal injury 
attorney advertising, patients today are probably more aware of their legal counseling options. 
93See e.g., Orentlicher, supra note 73, at 248 (stating that “most lawsuits are filed in the 
absence of negligence.”  However, this is probably a reflection of patients’, rather than 
attorneys’, misperception of whether negligence occurred.  Thus, even diligent pre-suit 
screening by attorneys does not adequately prevent such claims); Paul Weiler, The Case for 
No-Fault Medical Liability, 52 MD. L. REV. 908, 913 (1993) (claiming lawyers have difficulty 
deciding whether to file a claim). 
94See Bryan A. Liang, The Legal System and Patient Safety: Charting a Divergent Course, 
91 ANESTHESIOLOGY 609 (1999) [hereinafter Liang, The Legal System and Patient Safety]. 
95See e.g., Weiler, supra note 93, at 912-13 (finding only one-in-three likelihood of 
malpractice claims being paid to victims of serious injury caused by negligence). 
96See Liang, The Legal System and Patient Safety, supra note 94, at 609. 
97There is also undoubtedly what I would call a “hassle factor” threshold.  This is the point 
where a non-negligent (from the physician’s viewpoint) physician is willing to settle a claim 
for an amount of money that represents the value of closure and ending the personal distress of 
litigation. 
98See Leape et al., supra note 52, at 1447. 
99See Weiler, supra note 93, at 916-17. 
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seek to establish a foothold.100  These defensive practices are costly in both economic 
and human terms.  One study estimated the cost of defensive medicine at $18 billion 
annually.101  Aside from this economic waste, the mass effect of defensive medicine 
increases the risk of medical errors which result in patient injury.102  Thus, the legal 
system, or at least medicine’s reaction to it, has a causative role in the medical error 
rate.  Also, malpractice insurers seem satisfied with the status quo, because of the 
actuarial stability it provides, as long as the insurers retain their ability to refuse 
coverage of high risk doctors.103   
Reducing medical errors should result in higher quality and more cost-effective 
care.  The first step toward this end is error disclosure, and therein lies the rub.  
Given the already unpredictable nature of the medical malpractice tort process, 
doctors are unwilling to voluntarily disclose their errors for fear of discovery by 
plaintiffs.104  Admitting error so that is may be used against you is either foolish or 
masochistic.  It’s tantamount to giving aid and comfort to the enemy.  Although state 
laws may immunize certain mandated quality assurance monitoring or peer review 
processes from liability, they do not always protect the information from 
discovery.105  The information from these programs may be discoverable by plaintiffs 
under the traditional Hickman v. Taylor substantial need and undue hardship test.106  
Also, reporting the information to third parties, such as consultants, private and 
federal quality monitoring agencies, or in cases tried in federal courts, immunity may 
not apply.107  Hence, absent better assurance that error disclosure will not be 
discovered by plaintiffs, the medical community remains reluctant to volunteer this 
information.108   
                                                                
100See id., and, Liang, The Legal System and Patient Safety, supra note 94, at 610. 
101See Weiler, supra note 93, at 916-17. 
102See Liang, The Legal System and Patient Safety, supra note 94, at 610. 
103See Brennan, supra note 89, at 266. 
104See Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, supra note 8, at 55-59. 
105See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 395.0197(1) (2000) (requiring all licensed hospitals to establish 
an internal risk management program); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.111, § 203(d) (West 
2000)(same).  These statutes provide for immunity of risk management data from discovery. 
106Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).  Applies to attorney work product materials 
prepared in anticipation of litigation.  See id. at 510-11.  Alternatively, the information can 
sometimes be viewed as factual and thus not covered by the attorney-client privilege under 
Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981).  See Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, 
supra note 8, at 558-59.  See also Healthtrust v. Saunders, 651 So.2d (Fla. 1995) (denying 
discovery in absence of showing need and undue hardship). 
107See Liang, supra note 8, at 55-59 and nn. 53-61. 
108See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text. 
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IV.  CURES FOR MEDICAL ERRORS 
A.  Adopt a Systems Approach   
If medical errors are not being reduced by the traditional tort system,109 and 
individual physicians are operating at a level of efficiency that still produces an 
unacceptable error rate,110  then a new model for error reduction is necessary.111  This 
model, as previously mentioned, is the systems approach.112  The medical community 
has become increasingly aware of the need for such an approach, through studies of 
human error psychology and by examining other high-risk industries.113 
The medical profession, upon admitting its awareness of the systems-based 
influences and causes of medical error, is ethically compelled to pursue this approach 
if public opinion is to continue to grant physicians a foothold on the moral high 
ground.114  Despite obstacles, including the threat of litigation, the duty owed to 
patients is paramount.115  Besides, it would be foolish, and overtly self-destructive, if 
medicine waits until forces entirely outside of the profession dictate the terms of this 
endeavor.  Medicine’s limited remaining capacity to self-regulate would evaporate.  
If nothing else, a better approach to reducing errors, and a good faith effort to 
implement this approach, is a matter of self-preservation.   
Ironically, the threat of litigation has already led to some progress by medicine to 
incorporate a systems-based approach.  In response to the rising malpractice 
insurance costs of the 1980s, the field of anesthesiology became a pioneer in the 
application of the systems approach to medical error reduction.116  By assessing the 
systems in which anesthesiologists delivered care, and implementing technological 
advances, the mortality rate from anesthesia was reduced by over ten-fold.117  The 
anesthesiology field’s success was attributable to improved information strategies, 
development of practice guidelines and standards, human factors evaluation, strong 
leadership, and a multidisciplinary approach.118  Extending this approach to other 
areas of medicine appears worthwhile, with adjustments and fine tuning for 
outpatient and individual provider settings.   
                                                                
109See  Bodenheimer, supra note 7, at 490-92. 
110See Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, supra note 8, at 544-45. 
111See id.; IOM Report, supra note 3, at 56. 
112Id. at 71-75; Leape, supra note 49, at 1854-55. 
113See Bates & Gawande, supra note 58, at 765-66. 
114See id.; Leape, supra note 49, at 1851. 
115Id. at 1856; IOM Report, supra note 3, at 164. 
116See IOM Report, supra note 3, at 164 (citing anesthesiology study where anesthesia 
mortality was reduced from one in 10,000 to 20,000 to less than one in 200,000 through the 
use of monitoring devices). 
117See id. at 144-45. 
118See Bodenheimer, supra note 7, at 491-92; Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, supra note 
8, at 561-62; Leape, supra note 49, at 1856; IOM Report, supra note 3, at 173-74. 
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Leading medical and legal commentators have called for a systems approach to 
medicine which is modeled after those used in aviation and nuclear energy.119  These 
complex, high-risk industries have studied the causes of human error, and have 
implemented systems which reduce the influence of human imperfection.120  The 
common feature in these systems is that they expect and anticipate human error, and 
thereby integrate their systems to accommodate this reality.121  Given the complexity 
and variety of settings for healthcare delivery, there is no one size fits all approach.  
However, with some innovative thinking,122 leadership, and grassroots commitment, 
medicine can address the systems flaws it now is beginning to acknowledge.123   
B.  Collect the Data and Encourage Error Reporting 
Medical error reduction could lessen the unpredictability of the tort system by 
increasing the overall quality of care.  Less patients will be injured, shrinking the 
pool of potential plaintiffs.  To effect this change, errors need to be studied, which 
can only happen if they are more comprehensively reported.  The ideal error 
detection-prevention process should: 1) identify errors by individual providers 
practicing substandard care, 2) identify deficiencies which increase the risk of error 
by providers within a system, 3) establish methods to reduce errors in both contexts, 
and 4) provide legal safeguards and market incentives for voluntary error reporting. 
Licensing of individual physicians occurs at the state level.  In the 1889 decision 
Dent v. West Virginia,124 the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed this system as proper to 
ensure that physicians had the “requisite qualifications” to practice medicine.125  In 
1986, the Health Care Quality Improvement Act established the National Practitioner 
Data Bank (NPDB).126  The NPDB stores information about individual provider 
malpractice claims and decisions affecting clinical privileges.127  This information is 
used for credentialing and licensing purposes, and is protected from discovery by 
plaintiffs’ attorneys.128  Also, at the state level, statutes may require reporting of 
some adverse patient events.129  Together with traditional tort liability, state laws, 
licensing boards, and the NPDB provide checks on physician errors.  However, they 
are post facto reactive checks that do not systematically address error types and 
                                                                
119See IOM Report, supra note 3, at 159-66, 173-74. 
120See id. at 162-65. 
121See id. 
122See Paul Plsek, Innovative Thinking for the Improvement of Medical Systems, 131 ANN. 
INT. MED. 438, 438-44 (1999). 
123See IOM Report, supra note 3, at 156-57, 167. 
124129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889). 
125See id. 
12642 U.S.C. §§ 11101 et seq. (1986). 
127See IOM Report, supra note 3, at 121-22. 
128See id. at 122. 
129See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 458.351 (requiring physician reporting of “adverse incidents,” 
such as patient death or surgical complications). 
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causes, offering only the threat of punishment, which serves as a disincentive to 
voluntary error reporting. 
A healthcare system can be virtually any level of complexity, but for the 
purposes of this analysis, the hospital will be considered as the standard example.130  
Though no two hospitals are identical, and each department in a hospital represents a 
system within a system, they share some common features.  Hospitals are accredited 
for the most part by the private, not-for-profit Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO).131  Though JCAHO is a private entity, 
Medicare132 and many states require JCAHO accreditation as a condition of facility 
licensure or certification.133  JCAHO has a “sentinel event” policy which requires 
facilities to report certain bad outcomes.134  Hospitals are also commonly required by 
state statute to have an internal risk management program to investigate adverse 
patient incidents, and develop quality control and improvement programs.135  Thus, 
in the hospital context, there is at least some effort to identify and correct system 
errors. 
A more sophisticated approach is needed for detecting errors in both office and 
hospital settings, though.136  Many proposals exist for collecting and analyzing this 
data in a way that will provide meaningful insight into the causes of individual and 
systems-based errors.  One suggestion is for a “patient safety center” under the 
auspices of the National Institutes of Health.137  Under this proposal, error reporting 
by physicians and institutions would be mandatory, yet non-punitive unless errors 
are not reported as required.138  The data would be reported to a neutral third party 
which lacks sanctioning ability, similar to the Aviation Safety Reporting System 
                                                                
130For example, a large outpatient group practice has systems elements, such as practice 
protocols, nursing guidelines, or a central pharmacy, to name a few.  Arguably, even a solo 
practitioner performs under a system, because he or she develops standardized approaches to 
common problems, approaches which may promote error if the approaches have latent defects. 
131Managed care organizations such as HMOs are accredited by the National Committee 
on Quality Assurance (NCQA), a private organization.  See www.ncqa.org. 
13242 U.S.C. §§ 1395X(e), 1395bb. (2000) JCAHO accreditation suffices for Medicare 
certification purposes.   
133See FLA. STAT. § 395.0161.  For example, Florida allows JCAHO accreditation in lieu 
of state periodic inspection.   
134See Bryan A. Liang and Kristopher Storti, Creating Problems as Part of the Solution: 
The JCAHO Sentinel Events Policy, Legal Issues and Patient Safety, 33 AMER. J. HEALTH L. 
263, 264 (2000). 
135See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 395.0197 (providing for, “a) the investigation and analysis of the 
frequency and causes of general categories of specific types of adverse incidents to patients.” 
and “b) the development of appropriate measures to minimize the risk of adverse incidents to 
patients. . .”). 
136See e.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care: Regulation, 
Management, or the Market, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 825, 861-62 (1995) (suggesting that medical 
license boards have little effect on error rates). 
137See Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, supra note 8, at 561-62. 
138See id. at 561-64. 
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(ASRS).139  Other proposals include data collection by the National Patient Safety 
Foundation,140 or a federally funded Center for Quality Improvement in Patient 
Safety.141 
Assuming that a data collection center is established, one problem that the data 
collectors will have is deciding what data to gather.142  This is a technical issue 
beyond the scope of this paper.143  It is sufficient to note that merely collecting the 
data is a daunting task, subject to abstraction and interpretation bias.144 
Another concern with mandatory error reporting is liability exposure.  
Threatening to punish reporting failures may have some coercive influence,145  but 
does not efficiently promote the ultimate goal of simply obtaining the errors 
information for analysis and systems improvements.  Fully anonymous reporting 
might provide raw data, but would not lead consistently to corrective measures at 
specific sites, because only widespread problems would be addressable.  In the 
absence of anonymity then, what should be done to promote error disclosure 
information which is more useful to address problems at specific sites?   
Granting liability immunity to those who provide error data is one solution.146  
Many states already grant immunity to peer review and utilization review 
organizations.147  As noted earlier, such immunity does not extend to “administrative 
information,” such as certain safety data.148  For example, in State ex rel. United 
Hospital v. Bedell,149 the West Virginia Supreme Court held that a hospital’s incident 
report, made after a patient was injured in the hospital, was not immune from 
                                                                
139See id. at 561-62.  The ASRS collects data and provides it to NASA rather than the 
FAA.  Bypassing the FAA, which has the authority to sanction pilots and carriers, promotes 
voluntary error reporting.  See id. 
140See Bodenheimer, supra note 7, at 490.  The National Patient Safety Foundation was 
established in 1997 by the American Medical Association, and focuses on systems’ relations 
to medical errors.  See id. 
141See Remarks by the President on Medical Errors, Feb. 22, 2000.  (President Clinton 
proposed this center and a $20 million start-up fund.) www.ahrq.gov last visited Sept. 19, 
2000. 
142See UNDERSTANDING HEALTH OUTCOMES RESEARCH 214-217 (Robert L. Kane ed., 
1997). 
143See Jost, supra note 136, at 851-54, for an in-depth discussion of these technical issues. 
144See id. 
145See Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, supra note 8, at 562-64. 
146See id.  Professor Liang suggests federal legislation to protect “all safety analysis in 
continuous and ongoing safety programs.”  He emphasizes that immunity is conditioned upon 
the provider’s making actual use of the collected data.  See id. 
147See e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 766.101(1)-(7) (2000) (providing discovery and liability 
immunity to committee procedures and members, respectively); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.111, 
§ 203 (West 2000)(same). 
148See Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, supra note 8, at 556. 
149State ex rel. United States Hospital v. Bedell, 484 S.E.2d 199, 213 (D.C. W. Va. 1997). 
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discovery because it was not a document prepared in anticipation of litigation.150  
Other limitations on immunity may include the reports of peer review panels151 or 
information disclosed to third parties.152  If states wish to encourage error reporting, 
legislators may wish to extend immunity privileges to error data collecting activities.  
However, even if full immunity is not granted, some error data should be reportable 
without fear of litigation, such as when there has been no actual patient harm.153 
Instead of reporting medical errors directly to a national databank, I propose a 
different approach which is market-based and operates principally at the state level.  
A national databank would be unlikely to account for regional practice differences, 
and the solutions proposed would be aimed at a national lowest common 
denominator.  It is preferable to collect data at the state level, where accountability 
and flexibility are more immediate.154  This would allow a variety of approaches, and 
states which evolve desirable systems more rapidly than other states could serve as 
models.155  State legislatures, insurers, regulators, and professional organizations 
could look to these leading states and incorporate reporting systems features most 
desirable for their own state.  Market forces, such as funding decisions and insurance 
rates, would provide incentives not to be a laggard state.  Similarly, states would also 
decide immunity issues for themselves.  The data collected could still be passed on to 
a national databank, which could assess the data and make further 
recommendations.156  Rather than being used as a justification for new federal 
legislation, these recommendations could be used by market actors to provide 
incentives for states to evolve their own data collection process.  In this way, 
desirable market forces and state autonomy would be preserved. 
Instead of creating yet another federal bureaucracy,157 with all of the attendant 
inefficiencies, funding decisions for medical errors data collection and analysis, 
should occur using private resources at the state level.  However, I do not suggest a 
state bureaucracy instead of a federal one.  The data should be collected by a private 
company, which need not be confined to a state’s borders.  The private company 
                                                                
150See id. 
151See Bayfront Medical Center v. State, 741 So.2d 1226,1229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) 
(finding report of peer review process not privileged, though records of peer review process 
were) (emphasis added). 
152See Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, supra note 8, at 557.  “Nonhospital information” 
is, for example, information generated by the use of an outside safety expert.  See id. 
153Cf. Fred Rosner et al., Disclosure and Prevention of Medical Errors, 160 ARCH. INT. 
MED. 2089-92 (2000)(emphasizing ethical duty of physicians to admit error). 
154Florida established a Health Information Systems Council consisting of “executive-
level managers for the state’s health-related entities.”  See FLA. STAT. § 381.90(1) (2001).  
Minnesota law established a “[h]ealth outcomes data” collection process.  See MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 62J.301(a) (West 1996). 
155See e.g., Representative Jim Slatterly and Janet Murguia, The Role of the States in 
Health Care Reform, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 156, 161 (1993-94) (concluding that states are 
better able to implement healthcare reform measures than the federal government). 
156See supra notes 134-38, and accompanying text. 
157See id. 
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could contract directly with providers, who would incorporate the cost of collecting 
data into the cost of doing business.  The state could allow one or more such private 
entities to collect the data along specified parameters, and then report their findings 
directly to the state.158  Such a system would be cost-effective through the avoidance 
of fines and sanctions for failing to report errors, and ultimately through actual error 
reduction which results in lower liability insurance and litigation costs.  Any void in 
the market which presently exists for a private errors data collecting entity will be 
more efficiently filled by a private information technology company than by a new 
government bureaucracy, and market competition would promote efficiency and 
results. 
C.  Standards of Care and the Use of Practice Guidelines  
If a systems approach is adopted, and data collected, there remains the problem 
of how best to use the information in order to reduce errors.  It may appear obvious 
that errors will decrease by applying the best known practices to each patient.159  
However, medicine is less well suited for standardization than certain purely 
mechanical tasks, because of individual patient diversity and complexity.160  Also, 
many medical problems can be successfully treated in more than one way, which 
suggests there is not always a ready applicable “best” method for a given patient or 
problem.161  In spite of these difficulties, some standardization of medicine is 
possible to reduce patient risk.162  Clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) have thus 
emerged, and are developed continuously, with an emphasis on scientific evidentiary 
support.163  This section discusses how these guidelines affect the legal standard of 
care. 
Traditionally, the legal standard for medical negligence was based on the local 
practice custom established by the medical community.164  As medical knowledge 
                                                                
158An existing element of the state government, such as the Department of Health, could 
receive the data reports.  The state could follow the recommendations of the private analysts, 
or formulate its own recommendations.  The state’s role would be mainly that of oversight, 
which would not require much, if any, additional manpower. 
159See Charles Marwick, Will Evidence-Based Practice Help Span Gulf Between Medicine 
and Law?, 283 JAMA 2775, 2776 (2000). 
160See id. at 2776.  “Evidence-based medicine in practice defines the likelihood of 
something happening.  It is never 100 percent. . . [t]he same evidence applied in one case may 
not apply in another.  The circumstances of the individual patient may be different, or the 
circumstances may be the same, but patients may refuse one treatment in favor of another.”   
161See Arnold J. Rosoff, Legal Implications of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Emergency 
Medicine, in LEGAL MEDICINE 1, 7 & n.11 (Cyril H. Wecht ed., 1995) (discussing “respectable 
minority” practice variations). 
162See IOM Report, supra note 3, at 32 (citing anesthesia’s success in reducing operative 
mortality through the use of practice guidelines) available at 
http://books.rap.edu/books0309068371/html/. 
163Examples include the American Medical Association’s CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES 
DIRECTORY (1999) and the National Guidelines Clearinghouse’s website, avaliable at 
www.guideline.gov. 
164RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).  Adherence to custom may be 
considered by jury, but is not dispositive.  See id. 
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and sophistication evolved, so did the legal standard in two main ways.  First, a 
national standard of care applies to doctors practicing anywhere in the country, with 
some variation allowed to account for urban versus rural settings and resource 
availability.165  Second, regardless of a particular community’s customs, the objective 
standard of “skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession 
in good standing in similar communities” applies.166  This objective standard may at 
times serve as a basis to impugn an industry-wide practice as negligent.  A striking 
example was the Washington Supreme Court’s ruling in Helling v. Carey,167 which 
declared that failure to screen a young patient for glaucoma was negligence, even 
though it was not usual practice for eye doctors to perform screening at that age.168  
Thus, the law has forced medical standards of care to evolve, because the standard of 
care is ultimately a legal, rather than a medical, question.169 
Perhaps partly as a response to the law, medicine at the dawn of the 21st century 
is attempting to systematize and objectify standards of care through the 
establishment of CPGs based on scientific evidence.170  The Institute of Medicine 
defines CPGs as “systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and 
patient decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical circumstances.”171  
CPGs are generally developed by academic leaders and authoritative bodies for 
particular medical specialties.172  CPGs were initially promulgated as a quality 
improvement tool, but have also become cost-containment devices.173  Whether used 
to improve quality or lower costs, or both, a strong emphasis on evidence based 
medicine (EBM) is stressed as an underpinning for all CPGs.174  It is believed that a 
                                                                
165See Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So.2d 856, 879 (Miss. 1985) (allowing out of state physician 
expert witnesses to testify regarding standard of care in Mississippi, so long as the experts 
were made familiar with with the local “facilities, equipment, personnel and general medical 
resources available”). 
166RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A, cmt. g (1965). 
167519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974). 
168See id. at 984.  The Washington Supreme Court subsequently held that the state 
legislature intended to abolish the Helling rule in WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.290 (1975).  See 
Gates v. Jensen, 579 P.2d 374, 376 (Wash. 1978) (re-imposing traditional standard of “that 
degree of skill, care, and learning possessed by other persons in the same profession.”). 
169See Rosoff, supra note 161, at n.11. 
170See AMA Clinical Practice Guidelines, supra note 163. 
171INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES: DIRECTIONS FOR A NEW 
PROGRAM 8 (Marilyn J. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1990). 
172For example, CPGs have been promulgated by the American Colleges of Cardiology, of 
Pediatrics, and of Obstetrics and Gynecology.  See IOM Report, supra note 2, at 145-46. 
173See Rosoff, supra note 161, at 1-2; Arnold J. Rosoff, The Role of Clinical Practice 
Guidelines in Health Care Reform, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 369, 370 (1995).  See also FLA. STAT. 
ANN § 408.02 (West 200) (encouraging practice parameter development to improve resource 
utilization and decrease practice delivery variations). 
174See e.g., Gordon H. Guyatt et al., Evidence Based Medicine: Principles for Applying the 
User’s Guide to Patient Care, 284 JAMA 1290, 1295 (2000) (discussing need for evidence 
data gathering to improve practice guideline development). 
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strong scientific evidentiary basis for CPGs will promote broader applicability and 
acceptance by practitioners in a variety of clinical settings.175 
In theory, well designed and widely followed CPGs will reduce medical error 
through better overall practice quality.176  However, the potential or actual use of 
CPGs as the legal standard of care in negligence actions has caused doctors to 
hesitate in accepting them.177  One solution to reduce physician apprehension is to 
allow CPG use as purely exculpatory evidence in a malpractice suit.178  Maine and 
Kentucky have enacted statutes which adopt this approach, at least to some degree.179  
Ironically, such an approach may serve to reduce already low compliance with 
CPGs, because plaintiffs would not be able to introduce evidence of 
noncompliance.180  Thus, if CPGs are to function as effective error reduction 
mechanisms, they must be widely followed by doctors, so it may be important to 
allow plaintiffs to introduce evidence of CPG noncompliance.181  However, a catch-
22 situation could result if the law encourages compliance with guidelines as a 
presumptive standard of care, since the more widespread the use of CPGs becomes, 
the more they can be used against providers, irrespective of the broader quality of 
care effects of a given CPG.182  In this respect, physician reluctance to accept CPGs 
is rational. 
The goal of this discussion of CPGs is to emphasize caution by courts and 
legislators in adopting CPGs as legal standards of care.  Medical errors will be 
                                                                
175See id.  But see John D. Ayres, The Use and Abuse of Medical Practice Guidelines, 15 
J. LEGAL MED. 421 (1999).  Ayres states that “the strength of the scientific data and expert 
judgment should be made explicit in the guideline.”  See id. at 427.  Further, he argues that 
guidelines may be no more authoritative than text books or learned treatises, and that 
guidelines often address controlled environments, like operating rooms.  Also guidelines may 
be biased toward academic practice settings, failing to account for differences between urban 
and rural settings, and that guidelines are often outdated by the time they are published.  See 
id. at 427-32. 
176See IOM Report, supra note 2, at 135-36. 
177See Rosoff, supra note 161, at 2.  Rosoff cites other reasons besides litigation concerns 
which impact physicians’ acceptance of CPGs, including the fact that “doctors have been wary 
of “cookbook medicine” and, in general, any attempt to reduce complex professional 
judgments to standardized formulas. . .[CPGs] would tend to undermine professional 
autonomy,” and physicians’ perception that “third party payers will use them to deny payment 
for care that doctors believe should be provided to their patients. . .”  See id. 
178See Andrew L. Hyams et al., Medical Practice Guidelines in Malpractice Litigation: An 
Early Retrospective, 21 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & LAW 289, 292 (1996). 
179See e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Title 24, § 2975 (West 1999) (restricting use of practice 
parameter compliance evidence to affirmative defenses by doctors or their employers); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.035(8)(b) (Michie 1999) (creating presumption that standard of care 
met by adherence to practice guidelines). 
180See Hyams, supra note 178, at 292. 
181See id. at 292-304. 
182See Wendy K. Mariner, Outcomes Assessment in Health Care Reform: Promise and 
Limitations, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 37, 57 (1994) (expressing concern that guidelines “may 
inappropriately or inadvertently reduce the quality of care”) (emphasis added). 
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reduced by widespread application of what actually works best for a particular 
clinical scenario.183  However, blind adherence to CPGs may actually promote 
medical errors.184  CPGs must be developed with some inherent flexibility to allow 
for specific resource limitations, practice style differences, and individual patient 
variables and preferences.185  A per se approach that CPG conformity is not 
malpractice may unfairly prevent recovery by a patient who is injured by a 
physician’s negligent adherence to a CPG.186  Conversely, overly rigid CPGs might 
expose a doctor to liability when the reasonable and prudent approach is to not 
follow a CPG.187  A more workable legal approach is to incorporate CPGs as 
admissible evidence or as burden shifting devices in malpractice actions.188   
D.  Enterprise Liability 
If liability risks deter error reporting by physicians, perhaps the law can alleviate 
this concern.  As individual practitioner liability laws have evolved, so has the law 
with respect to insurers and hospitals.  Physicians have traditionally been the primary 
target of malpractice actions.  Until the 1950s, hospitals were legally protected under 
the doctrine of charitable immunity,189 and doctors were usually viewed as 
independent contractors rather than agents or employees of the hospital.190  Insurers 
were also insulated by the system of fee-for-service retrospective payment, because 
they were not actively involved in patient treatment decisions.191  For various policy 
and economic reasons, the law began to accept hospital and insurer vicarious or 
direct liability theories to allow plaintiff recovery in malpractice cases.192  This 
section discusses these theories using the term “Enterprise Liability (EL)” to 
encompass hospitals, insurers, and managed care and health maintenance 
organizations (MCOs, HMOs). 
                                                                
183See Rosoff, supra note 161, at 2. 
184See Ayres, supra note 175, at 442 (stating “[i]n some situations, adhering to guideline 
recommendations might increase the risk of an unfavorable clinical outcome.”). 
185See Rosoff, supra note 161, at 381 (describing “respectable minority” practice 
variations). 
186See id. 
187See id. at 425. 
188See supra note 179. 
189See generally President of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 
1942), considered the landmark case eliminating charitable immunity.  See also Kenneth S. 
Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the Evolution of the American 
Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381, 385 (1994) (discussing demise of charitable 
immunity doctrine). 
190See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW:  CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 237-38 
(Bd. ed.1997). 
191See Abraham and Weiler, supra note 189, at 394-96. Insurers became more active 
participants in healthcare decisions under prospective payment systems, such as diagnosis-
related groups (DRGs), implemented by Medicare in Private insurers, especially managed 
care, have followed suit with prospective payment systems.  See id. 
192See FURROW, supra note 190, at 238-44. 
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Enterprise liability is not a novel concept.  Rather, it is derived from the theory of 
respondeat superior, a policy-based tort theory which shifts the risk of liability to a 
company for the acts of its workers acting within their scope of duty.193  The policy is 
based on the assumption that it is better to have companies insure consumers and 
others against losses than for potential tort victims to self-insure.194  The theory 
expanded to apply in the products liability context.195  EL has been extended to the 
medical malpractice context, albeit less thoroughly.196  Vicarious liability is 
straightforward when a provider is an employee of a health plan or hospital, but 
when the provider is an independent contractor, EL generally rests upon how much 
control the enterprise exerted in a particular clinical situation.197  Thus, if a hospital 
or other entity directly controlled a clinical decision,198  or owned and operated 
particular equipment,199  a plaintiff may have a viable EL claim.  Also, EL may apply 
where a patient reasonably perceives and relies upon an apparent agency relationship 
between the provider and enterprise.200 
Besides vicarious liability, an enterprise may be directly liable for negligence.  
Mere cost-saving attempts are not negligent, as noted this year by the Supreme Court 
in Pegram v. Hedrich.201  However, an institution may be directly liable for failure to 
follow established protocols to provide an acceptable standard of care.  For example, 
the Illinois Supreme Court held in Jones v. Chicago HMO202 that an HMO may be 
liable for enrolling too many patients with a single doctor.203  There is considerable 
jurisdictional variation in applying EL legal standards, though.  State statutes may 
                                                                
193See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 189, at 383-84. 
194See George I. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 
1521, 1535 (1987).  See also Barry R. Furrow, Enterprise Liability and Health Care Reform:  
Managing Care and Managing Risk, in CROSS NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON HEALTH CARE 
REFORM 45, 47 (William R. Frey ed., 1995). 
195See Priest, supra note 194, at 1535 (citing Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 377 P.2d 
897 (Cal. 1963) as a landmark decision applying enterprise liability). 
196See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 189, at 383-84. 
197See FURROW, supra note 190, at 240-45. 
198See e.g., Berel v. HCA Health Servs., 881 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. App. 1994) (controlling 
details of provider’s practice decisions could create EL). 
199This is known as the “inherent function test.”  See FURROW, supra note 190, at 250-51 
(citing Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp., 500 P.2d 1153 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (finding hospital 
liable for x-ray equipment malfunction which injured patient, because hospital owned and 
maintained the equipment)). 
200See e.g., Petrovich v. Share Health Plan, 719 N.E.2d 756, 775 (Ill. 1999) (finding HMO 
vicariously liable under apparent agency theory). 
201530 U.S. 211, 219 (2000). 
202HMO, 730 N.E.2d 1119 (Ill. 2000). 
203See id. at 1135. 
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govern whether an HMO or other insurance plan can be sued for negligence.204  
Another means of finding an enterprise liable is under a negligence per se theory, 
where the institute violates a statute directly or by failing to establish and follow 
protocols required by statute.  For example, in Edwards v. Brandywine Hospital,205  
the court concluded that a violation of a Health Department standard could be per se 
negligence.206 
Aside from state statutory preclusion of EL, another significant obstacle to 
plaintiffs is ERISA207 preemption, which allows certain health plans to avoid state 
law claims for decisions that “relate to” health care plan administration.208  
Fortunately for some plaintiffs, and perhaps also for physicians who desire the risk-
sharing of EL, some courts are excluding state law based tort claims from ERISA 
preemption.  For example, the Tenth Circuit in Pacificare of Oklahoma v. Burrage209 
held that a vicarious liability malpractice claim could be remanded to state court and 
was not preempted.210  The Circuit Courts are divided with respect to state law tort 
claims and ERISA preemption.211  The Supreme Court did not directly address the 
state law claims issue from Pacificare and similar cases such as Pegram v. 
Hedrich.212  Thus, at least in some jurisdictions, health plans and other insurers face a 
                                                                
204This applies to direct or vicarious liability contexts.  See e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE § 1371.25 (Deering 2001) (allowing negligence actions against HMOs).  But see N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 26:2J-25 (West 1999) (prohibiting negligence claims against HMOs). 
205652 A.2d 1382 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). 
206See id. at 1386-87. 
207The Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2002).  Note that 
hospital liability is generally not at issue in this context. 
208ERISA, The Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2002) et 
seq., was intended by Congress to protect employees from health care plan abuses, but it has 
become a major weapon for health plans and insurers to limit their liability.  See Larry J. 
Pittman, ERISA’s Preemption Clause and the Health Care Industry: An Abdication of Judicial 
Law-Creating Authority, 46 FLA. L. REV. 355, 358-59 (1994).  A detailed discussion of ERISA 
preemption is beyond the scope of this paper.  Pittman’s article provides an in-depth review of 
ERISA, and he points out how ERISA is being used to “thwart the development of the law” in 
the area of third party negligence.  See id. at 356-59. 
20959 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995). 
210See id. at 153. 
211Pegram v. Hedrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).  The court describes the division among 
various District Courts on the issue.  See id. at 153, n.2.  See e.g., Bauman v. U.S. Healthcare, 
Inc., 193 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999) (allowing state court negligence action for prematurely 
discharging newborn from hospital).  But see McMahon v. Digital Equip. Corp., 162 F.3d 28, 
38 (1st. Cir. 1998) (finding negligence claim ERISA preempted); Jass v. Prudential Health 
Care Plan, 188 F.3d 1482, 1494 (7th Cir. 1996) (same).  See generally Bryan A. Liang, Patient 
Injury Incentives in Law, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 36-45 (1998) (discussing ERISA 
preemption and split among federal courts). 
212530 U.S. 211 (2000).  The Court unanimously held that breach of fiduciary duty was not 
an ERISA-based cause of action.  See id. at 214.  In dictum, the Court did not foreclose the 
possibility of state law claims avoiding ERISA preemption, “[t]he eligibility decision and the 
treatment decision were inextricably mixed.”  See id. at 229.  The Court went on to state “[n]or 
have we reason to discuss the interaction of such a claim with state law causes of action.”  See 
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lesser risk of state law tort liability, which allows them to avoid blame or shift it to 
the individual provider.213  This risk avoidance tactic seems to lessen the incentive to 
reduce medical error through cooperative quality improvement efforts between plans 
and providers. 
As noted earlier, the current tort system does not effectively or efficiently deter 
malpractice by individual providers.214  If one accepts the premise that malpractice is 
causally related to the rate of medical errors, then reducing malpractice would reduce 
errors.  To enhance the deterrence effect and efficiency of the tort system, it makes 
sense to extend the liability risk to the enterprises on the delivery side of health 
care.215  Although moral and ethical considerations should prompt efforts to reduce 
negligence and the resultant errors which harm patients, economic motivation will 
create a more practical necessity for change.216  Sharing liability with providers will 
force enterprises to foster an effective partnership with providers to reduce the costs 
of medical errors by improving healthcare quality at all levels.217  Part of the 
enterprise’s burden should ideally include informing patients with quality of care and 
error data, so that enterprises will face additional market pressure to improve care.218 
E.  Alternatives to the Standard Negligence Approach 
As noted in the preceding section, enterprise liability may encourage efforts to 
reduce medical errors by creating a shared risk-benefit between providers and 
hospitals and hospitals or insurers.  Enterprise liability theory still operates under a 
standard negligence model, though, because it merely extends duty to the enterprise 
through a vicarious or direct mechanism.  There are alternative liability theories 
which focus on other ways to reduce medical errors and their negative impacts or 
resultant liability risks.  The theories this section discusses are: apology; no-fault; 
and strict liability. 
                                                          
id. at n.9.  The Court may be asked to resolve the meaning of “inextricably mixed” in a future 
case.  Does it mean a negligence claim must be preempted for any ERISA plan? 
213See Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, ERISA Litigation and Physician Autonomy, 
283 JAMA 921 (2000).  The authors point out that ERISA-based plans cover 125 million 
Americans (citing Department of Labor estimates).  See id. at 921. 
214See William M. Sage et al., Enterprise Liability for Medical Malpractice and Health 
Care Quality Improvement, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 1, 2-3 (1994). 
215See id. at 7. 
216See Stuart Speiser et al., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS §1:30 (1983). 
217See Sage, supra note 214, at 1-3. 
218See Priest, supra note 194, at 1537.  “It is well accepted that the optimal level of 
accident prevention will be attained if incentives are created for both the provider and 
consumer to make additional safety investments up to the point at which the marginal costs of 
such investments equal their marginal benefits.”  See id.  But see Clark C. Havighurst, 
Vicarious Liability: Relocating Responsibility for the Quality of Medical Care, 26 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 7, 14-15 (2000).  Havighurst suggests that “the market alone cannot provide appropriate 
incentives to maintain quality because consumers cannot, in most cases, reliably assess the 
value of the services they receive.  The policy problem therefore, is to narrow the extent to 
which consumer ignorance allows providers to give less than optimal care. . .”  See id. 
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It seems like an ethical no-brainer that physicians who err should inform the 
patient of this fact as soon as the doctor learns it, regardless of actual harm.219  This is 
consistent with the highest form of professional ethics.220  However, there may be 
instances where error disclosure might harm the patient through adverse 
psychological effects.221  If this is the learned and reasonable judgment of a 
physician, then it seems ethical to not disclose an error to certain patients.222  
Conversely, error disclosure could actually increase a patient’s confidence in a 
provider.223  By admitting error, the physician exposes his own humanity, which a 
patient may not only empathize with but be reassured by, because they perceive their 
doctor as someone who is honest and will strive to protect the patient’s interests.224  
The default ethical position should be to disclose the error to the patient, unless it is 
clear that the patient will be harmed by the disclosure.225 
Unfortunately, a doctor’s decision to admit error and apologize for it is not, at 
least psychologically, just a straightforward ethical question.  Doctors fear being 
sued if they admit errors.226  In some instances, there is actual patient harm from a 
medical error, and the doctor will settle a claim or lose in court, irrespective of 
whether the doctor admits any error.  Most doctors probably agree that professional 
standards are maintained at higher levels by punishing certain negligent providers. 
Are there situations where doctors can admit their errors without risking a 
lawsuit?227  Certainly, if a patient isn’t harmed, then there may be no damages to 
                                                                
219See Loeben, supra note 9, at 81 (stating “on one side are individuals who feel strongly 
that patients should be told.”).  In fact, it is conceivable that the primary doctor should 
honestly address errors made by nurses or other providers.  See id.  See also Vogel & Delgado, 
supra note 69, at 94 (concluding that physicians should have a legal duty to admit errors, 
“because the medical profession does not regulate itself effectively, discourages the reporting 
of malpractice to patients, and erects formal and informal barriers to patients’ access to 
information.”) (emphasis added). 
220See Rosner et al., supra note 153, at 2092 (concluding that “truth telling should not be 
the mark of the heroic physician but rather a distinguishing feature of all decent physicians.”). 
221See Loeben, supra note 9, at 81. 
222See id. 
223See id. at 83 (stating “patients can understand and accept medical error much easier than 
they can understand and accept medical dishonesty.”). 
224See Steve S. Kramer & Ginny Hamm, Risk Management: Extreme Honesty May be the 
Best Policy, 131 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 963 (1999) (citing study which showed 43 percent 
of families were motivated to sue in part because of a suspicion of a cover-up, betrayal of 
trust, or desire for revenge). 
225See id. at 967. 
226See Bates & Gawande, supra note 58, at 764-66.  The authors point out that failure to 
admit error is ethically contradictory to physicians’ “fierce ethic of individual responsibility.”  
See id. at 764. 
227See Cohen, supra note 72, at 1473-74.  The Lexington VA Hospital experience has been 
positive in this respect, both economically and ethically.  In addition, telling the truth may 
improve morale by allowing providers to do the “right thing.”  Besides morale boosting, 
apology may have positive effects on business goodwill and reputation.  Cohen uses the 
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interest a plaintiff’s attorney.  However, the patient could fire the doctor, or 
somehow impugn the doctor’s reputation, so the doctor may still have an economic 
incentive to remain silent.  Perhaps, though, there is a human tendency to forgive that 
is being overlooked by doctors (or hospitals and insurers).228  It is doubtful that 
doctors are widely actually dishonest or are perceived as dishonest.229  Unfortunately, 
it is the medical culture itself which inhibits a more optimal level of honesty with 
respect to medical errors.230  Fortunately, medical leaders are realizing that admitting 
errors is one step toward fixing the overall problem, and is a better ethical 
approach.231   
Apology presents a cost-effective and ethical approach to medical errors in a 
context like a Veterans’ Administration Hospital, partly because providers are 
insulated from individual liability.232  In the private sector context, the applicability 
of apology may be limited to the enterprise’s willingness to accept or share the 
liability risk with the individual provider.233  One approach that automatically 
imposes risk on the enterprise is a no-fault system of medical injury liability, which 
focuses on causation rather than duty.234  The proponents of various no-fault systems 
argue that such systems reduce administrative costs and improve compensation to 
injured patients.235  Florida already has a limited no-fault medical liability system, 
                                                          
example of Johnson & Johnson’s behavior in response to the Tylenol poisoning scandal.  See 
id. at 1474-76. 
228But see Philip G. Peters, The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at 
the Millenium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 196 (2000) (citing studies which show declining 
public confidence in medical practitioners). 
229In my personal experience as a physician, patients seem quite willing to forgive 
mistakes, such as medication side effects, when I apologize to them and emphasize my 
willingness to continue to help them fix their problem.  In another context, perhaps President 
Clinton could have avoided impeachment if he had been promptly honest and apologetic for 
his sexual indiscretions.  In that context, though, unwillingness to be honest may reflect a 
more fundamental character trait, which is arguably selected by the political process. 
230See Bates & Gawande, supra note 58, at 763; Leape et al., Preventing Medical Error, 
supra note 51, at 1444. 
231See Leape et al., Preventing Medical Error, supra note 52, at 1447. 
232See Kraman & Hamm, supra note 224, at 965.  VA providers do not pay malpractice 
premiums, and are not named individually in malpractice claims.  They are reported to the 
National Practitioner Data Bank for actual malpractice payouts.  See id.  Malpractice insurers 
also contribute to physicians’ reluctance to admit errors, but if the insurers realized a net 
savings from honest error admission, they would probably be more receptive to this approach.  
See id. at 965-67. 
233See id. 
234See e.g., Abraham & Weiler, supra note 189, at 432-36 (promoting no-fault approach to 
medical malpractice); Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury: 
Theory and Evidence, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 99-120 (1998) (analyzing pros and cons of no-
fault system); Paul C. Weiler, supra note 93, at 950 (1993) (favoring no-fault approach). 
235See e.g., Weiler, supra note 93, at 923-35 (discussing benefits of no-fault compensation 
to injured patients, and decreased administrative costs). 
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which applies to Workers’ Compensation and brain-damaged newborns.236  Data 
indicates that administrative costs are lower and patients are compensated faster than 
in the traditional tort system, though overall costs are not lower.237 
Strict liability has also been proposed as a method to reform the current 
malpractice system.238  Strict liability theory is a policy based cost-shifting 
mechanism which is applied to promote public safety through injury prevention.239  
Strict liability has yet to be applied to medical services, but is applicable to certain 
medical devices under products liability laws.240  For example, in Porter v. 
Rosenberg,241 Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeals acknowledged that strict 
liability applied to silicone breast implant manufacturers and distributors.242  
However, the surgeon in the case was not strictly liable for selecting and using the 
implant.243  The Porter court left open the possibility of strict liability for a service 
provider where the “essence of the transaction” between the patient and the provider 
was akin to a business-customer relationship.244   
V.  CAPITALISM 
A.  The Entitlement Mentality 
This discussion of the causes and potential solutions to medical errors is 
incomplete without at least a brief analysis of the roles of patients as consumers, and 
the economic forces which have fostered and perpetuated the current healthcare 
market in the United States.245  As discussed in section II.C of this article, healthcare 
                                                                
236See Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 234, at 82-83 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 766.305, 
766.315, and describing a similar approach in Virginia). 
237See id. 
238See Barry Furrow, Defective Medical Treatment: A Proposal For the Application of 
Strict Liability to Psychiatric Services, 58 B.U. L. REV. 392, 434 (concluding strict liability 
should apply to “defective medical treatment” in a manner similar to products liability). 
239See id. at 410-411. 
240See FURROW, supra note 190, at 265-70.  The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 402A (1965), provided the traditional rule of products liability.  See DAVID W. ROBERTSON 
ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 558 (1998).  There is now a RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TORTS (1997) devoted specifically to products liability.  See id. 
241650 So.2d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). 
242See id. at 81. 
243See id. at 83.  See also Tanuz v. Culberg, 921 P.2d 309, 316 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) 
(concluding that public policy precluded strict liability against physician using jaw joint 
implants). 
244See Porter, 650 So.2d at 83. 
245A detailed discussion of either is beyond the scope of this article.  See generally Weiler, 
supra note 93, at 950 (favoring no-fault); Bovbjerg & Sloan, supra note 234, at 99-120 
(discussing pros and cons); Mark F. Grady, Why Are People Negligent?  Technology, 
Nondurable Precautions, and the Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 NW. L. REV. 293, 306-
310 (1988) (discussing strict liability, effects of technology, and transaction costs). 
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delivery ultimately occurs at the individual patient level.246  Patients’ perceptions, 
and their willingness or ability to pay for their own medical care influence the rate of 
medical errors.247  The law operates in this context to support, propagate, or even 
expand error rates. 
At this point in our nation’s history, universal healthcare is not a fundamental 
right.248  The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged a right to healthcare under the 
Eighth Amendment for prison inmates,249 and under the Fourteenth Amendment for 
confined mental patients,250 due to these groups’ “special relationship” with the 
government.  In other cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has expressly refused to grant 
healthcare the status of a fundamental right.  In Harris v. McRae, the Court rejected a 
right to state funded abortions.251  In Youngberg v. Romeo,252 the Court stated that it 
was an “established principal” that “[a]s a general matter, a State is under no 
constitutional duty to provide substantive services within its border.”253  The 
Youngberg Court did find a due process right to minimally adequate training to 
ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint for a severely retarded patient who 
was involuntarily committed.254  Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to grant 
constitutional right status to healthcare for the general population, suggesting a 
proper deference to the political process and legislature. 
In every state, though, there already exists broad access to medical care through 
Medicaid255 and Medicare256 programs.  Medicaid, a federally assisted state program, 
provides coverage to needy children and adults.  Medicare, also federally funded, 
provides coverage for the disabled and for persons over age sixty-five.  Thus, even 
though there is not an absolute right to healthcare, benefit programs already exist for 
those patients willing to declare and substantiate their need for assistance. 
Patients not covered by Medicaid or Medicare rely upon employer provided 
insurance benefits, or must purchase their own coverage out-of-pocket.  This still 
                                                                
246See supra notes 234-44 and accompanying text. 
247See supra note 246. 
248See e.g., Van M. Halley, The Right to Health Care: Key Policy Issue or Useless 
Concept, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 101, 120 (1993) (stating that absent a “special relationship” 
between the state and a patient, healthcare is not a constitutional right). 
249See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-104 (1976) (stating it would be “cruel and 
unusual punishment” to deny prisoners adequate healthcare). 
250See 457 U.S. 307, 324-25 (1982). 
251448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980). 
252Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320. 
253See id. at 324-25. 
254See id. 
25542 U.S.C.S. § 1396 (2000) et seq.  Established in 1965, Medicaid provides, “(1) medical 
assistance on behalf of families with dependent children. . . whose income and resources are 
insufficient to meet the costs of necessary services,” and “(2) rehabilitation and other services 
to help such families attain of retain capability for independence or self care. . .” 
25642 U.S.C.S. § 426 (2000) et seq.  Also established in 1965, Medicare provides for 
healthcare for individuals over age 65, and disabled individuals.  See id. at §§ 426(a)-(b). 
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leaves as many as forty-four million Americans without health insurance.257  
Proponents of universal health insurance emphasize these uncovered millions when 
such plans are debated.258  What such proposals ignore, though, is the dynamic nature 
of this uninsured group.  Most are young and between jobs, and many have simply 
chosen to not purchase insurance.259  Many of those between jobs could have elected 
to continue employer-sponsored coverage under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget 
Act of 1985 (COBRA) for at least eighteen months.260  In contrast, less than one 
percent of the elderly are without insurance.261  Therefore, those who need insurance 
the most, the poor, disabled, and elderly, already have access to it through existing 
programs.  It may be that younger people without insurance have simply accepted a 
certain risk in exchange for saving money not spent on insurance. 
Even if universal healthcare attained legal right status, there would remain the 
fact that medical services must be paid for.  This is where the entitlement mentality 
rears its ugly head, because too many patients insist upon a scope of services which 
they are unable or unwilling to pay for.  Patients are too often not aware of the true 
costs of coverage and services, creating what one commentator describes as a “moral 
hazard.”262  Instead of using health insurance for the usual insurance function as 
protection against unpredictable loss, people tend to “over-insure” themselves for 
healthcare.263  They do so in large part because the law promotes employer and 
government sponsored insurance.264  Patients are thereby encouraged to assume that 
their care is or should be paid for by their employers or the government.265 
The economic reality, which such a mindset ignores, is that neither the 
government nor employers actually pay for healthcare.  The government creates no 
wealth, it can only confiscate and redistribute it through what Frederic Bastiat 
                                                                
257See www.hhs.gov, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) website, 
testimony of Claude Earl Fox, M.D., Administrator of the Health Resources and Services 
Administration, before the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 
Subcommittee on Public Health, March 23, 2000.  Website accessed Oct. 13, 2000.  See also 
Geri Aston, Uninsured Numbers Down; Struggle Goes On, 43 AMER. MED. NEWS, Oct. 16, 
2000, at 5 (citing U.S. Census Bureau figures which show 42.6 million uninsured Americans 
in 1999, down 1.7 million from 1998). 
258See e.g., James E. Dalen, Health Care in America: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 
160 ARCH. INT. MED. 2573, 2575 (2000) (citing figure of 43 million uninsured Americans, and 
advocating employer mandated health insurance); Frank Davidoff, The 28th Amendment, 130 
ANN. INT. MED. 692-94 (1999) (suggesting constitutional amendment to provide universal 
health insurace). 
259See supra note 257, HHS website data (describing uninsured as commonly between 
ages 21 and 24, and workers who experienced “some unemployment”). 
26029 U.S.C.S. §§ 1161, 1162(2) (2000). 
261See supra note 257. 
262See Clark C. Havighurst, American Health Care and the Law-We Need to Talk!, 19 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 84, 86-88 (2000). 
263See id. at 88. 
264See id. at 87-88. 
265See id. 
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accurately labeled as “legal plunder.”266  The government does not pay for anything, 
the productive citizens do.  Employers also do not pay for healthcare, because the 
costs are passed on to consumers through higher prices, and to employees through 
wages adjusted for the expense of insurance.  Therefore, what those who claim is an 
entitlement to healthcare are really demanding is the property of their fellow citizens, 
and they must rely on the coercive power of the government to take it for them.267   
Perhaps before patients insist upon an entitlement to the fruits of their fellow 
citizens’ labor, they should pause to consider the consequences of such a mentality.  
For example, a prominent feature of the 2000 presidential campaign was each 
candidate’s prescription drug plan for Medicare patients.268  The premises of such 
plans were flawed in at least two major ways.  First, the vast majority of Medicare 
patients are over age sixty-five, a segment of the population which is wealthier on 
average than the younger people who will pay the lion’s share of the cost.  Second, 
these proposals for prescription drugs create a disincentive for younger people to 
save for their retirement needs.269  Plans like these only reinforce the entitlement 
mentality by passing along costs to those who bear the burden of paying for others’ 
healthcare.270  Do the Medicare beneficiaries of such plans properly view their desire 
for prescription drugs as a burden on their children and neighbors? 
The impact of the entitlement mentality on medical errors should be self-evident.  
At some point, freedom of choice is restricted by the strings attached to entitlement 
programs.  For example, only certain doctors or hospitals will accept Medicare or 
Medicaid.  The patient is thus less able to effectively provide the economic 
incentives to reduce medical error by seeking care from competing providers.  Thus, 
shielding selected providers from full-fledged market competition reduces the threat 
that patients will shop elsewhere for a lower error-rate doctor or hospital.  Without 
such an economic threat, providers have less incentive to improve quality through 
reduced error rates. 
B.  Contractual Freedom 
Suppose the federal government, responding to “the high price of automobiles,” 
enacted legislation to provide universal automobile purchasing insurance.  An 
insurance policy, provided by the government or the employer, allows each citizen to 
purchase a car from a participating auto maker.  Each insured person purchases the 
car he or she wants, as long as the purchase is pre-approved.271  This creates an 
                                                                
266See FREDERIC BASTIAT, THE LAW 10-13 (Dean Russell trans., Foundation for Economic 
Education, Inc., 1997) (1850). 
267See id. 
268See Michael Fumento, Bribing the Elderly: Bush and Gore Push Free Drugs In Bid for 
Key Votes, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Oct. 6, 2000, at A24. 
269See id. 
270See Robert J. Samuelson, It’s More Than a Drug Problem, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 25, 2000, 
at 37. 
271Analogous to the prospective payment system for healthcare.  See generally, Abraham 
& Weiler, supra note 189, at 393-96 (describing prospective payment system).  This analogy 
is perhaps tenuous with respect to emergency medical care, because people do not have the 
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incentive for each person to use the insurance and purchase the most expensive car 
allowed by the policy, regardless of need or ability to pay.272  At some point, the 
program becomes too costly, and a limit is placed on car prices.  It is illegal for the 
seller to exceed the price limits, or to allow any covered person to pay the seller 
directly for amounts that exceed coverage limits.273  Participating car sellers would 
then attempt to maximize profit by reducing production costs, motivated to improve 
quality only to the extent of the buyers’ ability to choose between participating 
sellers. 
It is hard to imagine Americans accepting such restrictions on their choice of 
what car they can buy, yet such a system already exists to limit individual choice for 
healthcare, arguably a more personal choice than choosing a car.274  The providers of 
healthcare, primarily doctors and hospitals, though private insurers may also be 
included here, are similarly restricted in their choices of what care to provide.275  
Contractual freedom to choose either the care received or the care provided is 
restricted.276  If freedom to choose is restricted by non-market forces, then incentives 
to improve quality are reduced to the extent competition is discouraged.  This 
translates into a suboptimal climate for medical error detection, admission, and 
reduction.277  Therefore, both patients and providers must have greater contractual 
freedom if market efficiencies are to affect medical error reduction.278   
One example on the provider side of healthcare contracts is “without cause” 
termination clauses.  Professor Liang calls for an end to these clauses in provider 
                                                          
same emergency need to purchase a car.  However, the point is, that some thought must be 
given to healthcare ahead of time, because nearly everyone will eventually need medical care. 
272See Havighurst, supra note 262, at 99 (describing healthcare costs, stating 
“. . .consumers do not regularly or systematically compare benefits to cost. . .”). 
273See id. at 89.  “The rising costs of the public programs led eventually to regulation-like 
reforms. . .” of medical care.  See id. 
274See id.  With respect to medicine, Havighurst states that, “Congress could not have 
forseen how the infusion of so much money into the health care system, coupled with the 
moral hazard that accompanies any form of third-party payment, would forever alter not just 
the economics but also the culture of medical care.”  I disagree that this was not foreseeable.  
The effects of government financing and regulation are foreseeable when economic 
motivation is considered in terms of dynamic rather than static terms.  I doubt that Congress 
couldn’t have foreseen this.  Medicare is properly viewed as a political strategy to influence 
voters, rather than a sound economic program.  
275See id. at 89-92. 
276See id. at 96.  “Not only are many important aspects of health care transactions 
prescribed by explicit regulation, but today’s health care contracts do not even attempt to 
specify in customized terms the desired character, quantity, and quality of the services that 
customers purchase.”  See id.  Havighurst, supra note 262 at 96. 
277See Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, supra note 7, at 565, (describing need to end 
“without cause” termination clauses in provider contracts in order to encourage provider 
participation in error reporting). 
278See id. (discussing provider choice); Havighurst, supra note 262, at 97 (discussing 
consumer choice). 
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contracts with HMOs and other managed care entities.279  This will encourage 
physicians to report errors without fear of backlash.280  Unfortunately, Professor 
Liang’s remedy is federal legislation, thus further entangling the government in our 
healthcare system.281  This is like Socrates asking for more hemlock.  Physicians 
should admit they are in their current situation precisely because they have lobbied 
for federal involvement in healthcare, and they helped get Medicare and Medicaid 
passed in the first place.282  Now physicians lament the fact that the market has 
reacted to restrict their contractual freedom.283  A sounder approach by physicians to 
obtain contractual freedom is to reject these contracts up front, or argue in court that 
they should not be enforced for policy reasons.284  Otherwise the medical community 
is further abdicating its position as a market player to the federal government.  The 
result can only be increased dependency on government for subsequent solutions.285 
On the patient side of healthcare contracts, contractual freedom needs to be 
enhanced as well.286  As with physicians, though, patients are also to blame for the 
                                                                
279See Liang, Promoting Patient Safety, supra note 8, at 564. 
280See id. 
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easily disregarded.  See e.g., American Medical Ass’n. v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 534-36 
(1943) (finding Sherman Act violations and restraint of trade by medical organizations).  
Medical leaders should use the literature to voice how this process could occur in a non-
collusive and ethical manner.  The recent case of Harper v. Healthsource of New Hampshire, 
Inc., 674 A.2d 962 (N.H. 1996), should provide some reassurance that courts are willing to 
view without cause termination clauses as counter to public policy.  That is the decision of the 
Harper court, even in the absence of federal legislation.  See id.  The California Supreme 
Court also found a without cause contract termination clause invalid in Potvin v. Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Co., 997 P.2d 1153, 1167-68 (Cal. 2000).  The Potvin court found that the 
contract unfairly restricted the doctor’s common law right to fair procedure, and impaired the 
doctor’s ability to practice in a particular geographic area, because the insurer had such a large 
market share.  See id. at 1167-68.  The medical community should pursue the without cause 
contractual issue at the state rather than the federal level. 
285Cf. Roger Pilon, Freedom, Responsibility, and the Constitution: On Recovering Our 
Founding Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 507, 546 (1993) (arguing that the law has 
evolved away from founding principles, and concluding, “the time has come to recover these 
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286See Havighurst, supra note 262, at 97. 
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current restrictions on their choices.287  Clearly, not all patients have voted to involve 
the federal government in financing healthcare.288  However, the political process 
continues to operate under the premise that one group of voters, particularly the 
elderly with respect to healthcare, can organize to redistribute the wealth of other 
citizens to pay for the elders’ healthcare.289  Politicians fall in line because their main 
goal is re-election.290  While it is true that this disparity cannot progress 
indefinitely,291  the concept of medicine and other entitlement programs must be 
addressed realistically.292  Either patients must accept greater responsibility for their 
family’s healthcare, or they must accept choice limitations along with the money 
redistributed from others.293  The causal chain of events for the latter is less choice, 
less competition, and less pressure to improve quality and reduce medical errors. 
It should be clear that neither providers nor patients can have their cake and eat it 
too, when the assertion is made that medical error reduction will be enhanced by 
contractual freedom.  Doctors, patients, and politicians will continue to be motivated 
by their own self-interest.294  In general it is just such self-interest which enhances 
market efficiency.295  However, the redistribution mentality of healthcare thwarts this 
efficiency, because too few people are actually aware of what their own healthcare 
costs.296  Thus, there is less bargaining in the traditional contract sense.297  Both sides 
of the bargain need to acknowledge that by asking the government to get involved in 
healthcare financing, they have relinquished their bargaining power.298  Unless the 
provider-patient transaction occurs in a more arms-length fashion, without the 
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293See id. 
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295See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, book IV, ch. II, at 421 (1776).  “Every 
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government middleman, contractual freedom, and thus its ability to lower medical 
error rates, will continue to be limited.299 
C.  Economic Rationale 
Just as a systems approach should be taken with respect to the detection, analysis, 
and reduction of medical errors, a fundamental reassessment of the healthcare 
financing system is urgently needed.300  The market efficiencies of capitalism should 
be embraced, rather than restricted, by policy makers.  Legislators, patients, 
providers, and even lawyers must acknowledge resource limitations, rather than 
make unsustainable promises through programs which pass costs along to taxpayers 
and succeeding generations.301  Sooner, rather than later, the notion that “you get 
what you pay for” must be emphasized.  If the system continues to tell patients that 
they get what others pay for, it will collapse of its own weight, because those who 
are actually paying will lose the incentive to be productive. 
As noted earlier, healthcare is not a fundamental right, but most Americans have 
health insurance through their job or a government program.302  Others elect to pay 
out-of-pocket for insurance or direct costs.  Still others freely elect to forgo care or 
insurance.  The minority of Americans left wanting for care or insurance will benefit 
from market solutions.  For example, self-employed individuals and small businesses 
can form risk pool alliances which allow them to negotiate better insurance rates.303  
Florida created just such a program in the Florida Health Care and Insurance Reform 
Act of 1993, which established community based health purchasing alliances.304  
Another approach is to reconsider the purpose of health insurance, which is to 
prevent unpredictable costs.305  Many people can probably afford to trade-off 
between a higher deductible in exchange for lower premiums, as is done for home or 
auto insurance.  Paying directly for certain small incidental costs would encourage 
true consumerism, while catastrophic losses would be avoided.   
People should not be forced to buy what they don’t want or need, yet that is 
exactly what is happening with many current policies through a one size fits all 
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approach.306  Why should a fifty year old man have the same plan as a twenty-five 
year old woman?  Employer sponsored plans could offer a greater menu of choices 
for a better custom fit for each employee.  This allows employees flexibility to pay 
only for what they need or want.  What the employee “saves” in benefits could 
thereby be realized as increased wages.  Ideally, the tax code would equalize 
treatment for this variety of individual expenses, but a discussion of how this could 
be done is beyond the scope of this article. 
The free market, and not the government, is the most efficient solution to 
increase access to healthcare, control costs, and improve quality through error 
reduction.  A free market “gives people what they want instead of what a particular 
group thinks they ought to want.”307  As a critical corollary to this notion, the free 
market promotes individual responsibility by emphasizing that consumers get what 
they actually pay for.  Government and the law play an important role in adjusting to 
and promoting competition, by enforcing contracts, and preventing fraud and 
deception.308  This creates an awareness by consumers, who in turn vote with their 
wallets when the market fails to meet their needs.  In the recent case of Pegram v. 
Hedrich,309 the Supreme Court acknowledged that cost-control measures are 
necessary, and are influenced by market forces and negligence risks. Socialized 
medicine, on the other hand, will reduce market incentives to lower medical error 
rates, because consumer choice will be restricted.  The economic incentives to 
produce a safer product will be blunted by reduced consumer choice and cost 
awareness.   
Healthcare should remain a service, and not a right.  Businesses who provide the 
service of healthcare, whether for profit or not, must still attend to the bottom line.  
That bottom line requires them to control costs while still offering a product that 
consumers demand.  A business must face the threat that a competitor will create a 
more desirable product, either because it’s cheaper, safer, or better in other ways.  
What the market will bear requires constant vigilance and adaptation by the business 
that wishes to remain viable.  If what consumers ultimately desire is safer healthcare, 
then politicians, lawyers, insurers, and providers should honor that choice as 
promoting the essence of our liberties.  Medical error rates will then fall as a 
necessary predicate for providers’ market survival.  The magic of capitalism’s 
“invisible hand” will always create a niche for the able entrepreneur.310   
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